Tag Archives: Entrepreneur

Academic Entrepreneurialism

The Academic Health Science Centre undertakes three important missions:

  • they treat patients

  • they conduct research

  • they teach the next generation of clinicians

The AHSC model, as a structured and integrated organisational form, is most developed in the US, Canada, Netherlands, UK, Sweden and a few others, and emergent in other countries.

They are a distinct and probably unique type of organisation, quite expensive to run (annual revenue streams on the order of €2 billion or more), very complex and home to a diversity of stakeholders. Often, AHSCs are thought of simply as teaching hospitals in a loose affiliation with universities but this underpowers their role.

The AHSC represents the most robust model of an institution that could be seen as sitting at the nexus of innovation and entrepreneurialism in health sciences. They essentially own the challenges facing us in the biomedical and treatment arenas, and have access to, or indeed may own, their own research capacity to solve those problems – they can be seen as both producer of new knowledge and consumer of it. And through their role in the intergenerational transfer of knowledge (i.e. teaching), they can influence future priorities, and clinical treatment practices within healthcare systems. As large and potentially well connected organisations, they have the potential to access considerable sums of start up capital, and spin-out a variety of new companies.

Not all teaching hospitals have the capacity to be an AHSC. Not all universities become an AHSC simply by linking their medical schools to a hospital, anymore than simply bolting on some labs to a hospital creates productive research capacity.

Virtually all countries, and regional economies, prioritise biomedical research probably within at least their top 5 areas of investment – despite frequently have significant deficiencies. While thinking that an AHSCs may be seen as the best local solution, local capacity can be lacking or weak. A critical worry is that AHSCs will be created from small, dysfunctional, and poorly performing institutions into large dysfunctional and poorly performing institutions, wasting public money, frustrating researchers and would-be entrepreneurs, weakening treatment capacity, and failing to deliver the innovations.

Internationally, AHSCs should be seen as sitting at the top of the healthcare pyramid, providing care from the simplest up to the most complex, and with unique expertise. While challenging to national/regional innovation strategies (which are often parochial in perspective), AHSCs should be at the forefront of international collaborations and integral to globalisation of knowledge transfer and evidence-based care.

Therefore, creating an AHSC as a driver of innovation and home to entrepreneur is not to be undertaken lightly.

One aspect of the AHSC that is particularly important to conceptualise and operationalise effectively is how they commercialise their intellectual property as a result of being both owners of problems, and creators of solutions to these problems. Risks here include inappropriate de-risking of research, premature efforts at commercialisation, confusion over ownership of the work itself, and conflict between institutional components on the methods to choose. These all track back into the AHSC itself, and how it is governed and how the executive suite and board, decide what can and cannot be done, or done well.

The paper draws on the author’s professional experience of working in an AHSC, working with an AHSC in thinking through their commercialisation strategy, and comparative policy research on commercialisation of research and strategies.

What is an Academic Health Science Centre?

AHSCs come in many forms. Understanding why particular arrangements are needed is important to ensuring that AHSCs are not created out of poorly performing component institutions. They are not simply an aggregation logic for pooling knowledge and capabilities. AHSCs can be vertically integrated providers through to a confederation of autonomous institutions. In some countries, the structure of AHSCs is accredited, mandated or otherwise designated, while in others, they emerge as a logical and rational solution to various research/ treatment/ teaching challenges. In addition, AHSCs also form networks for further collaboration.

Depending on national funding systems in higher education and in healthcare, AHSCs may have to deal with a large number of government ministries or agencies (in addition to health and higher education: social/community care, research councils, labour, industry/commerce ) which may be at differing levels in government (national/federal, state, local) as well as charitable and international sources. With this comes a diversity of public supervisory and oversight arrangements, which unsurprisingly may conflict on a number of levels: research priorities, service delivery objectives, degrees of institutional autonomy, and not to ignore the diversity of political interest which may complicate this further.

And within this mix, the challenge of coordination looms very large, to accommodate the autonomy of constituent parts, public accountability and institutional mission.

How should AHSCs organise themselves to conduct research and development for commercialisation?

AHSCs should be understood as accelerators of innovation. In virtue of owning the problems, they can disseminate new practices, enhance the evidence base for treatment options, and alter the very structure of service delivery itself.

Therefore, a critical issue for an AHSC is how they go about commercialisation, that is, operationalising the acceleration and dissemination of innovation and how they enable the entrepreneurial nature of researchers.

Particular challenges arise when higher educational institutions and healthcare organisations are state owned and run, with the result that staff (academics and researchers) are public employees or civil servants. This has the potential to create difficulties for individuals who may wish to be entrepreneurial yet retain their relationship to those issues which sparked the innovation in the first place.

Problems in this area have been raised by the French government with respect to the visibility and commercialisation of national research from state-owned laboratories and from the universities themselves. Institutional restrictions on commercialisation can create conflicts as in the UK where the universities pursue one approach while NHS hospitals use NHS/Department of Health commercialisation strategies.

External sources of seed capital are faced with constructing sensible funding arrangements in this environment. This has led institutions such as Karolinska in Sweden or Imperial Innovations in the UK to create an entrepreneurial subsidiary to deal with the commercialisation process. We are a long way from simple technology transfer here.

What are implications for policy: on research, on commercialisation and on higher education?

At some level, AHSCs are ill-defined in the European context, what their characteristics are, how they are organised and perform. Sensible investigation is needed to identify the performance, role and function of AHSCs in Europe, and to understand whether they are in fact a nexus of innovation or a quagmire of bureaucratic interference.

We need lessons and cases to draw on to understand how to structure appropriate innovation policies that may require the formation of high performing AHSCs that can be breeders of entrepreneurs. We also need to think beyond biomedical research as the potential scope of AHSCs includes innovations in systems and ways of working, health information technology and software, medical devices and not just medicines and so on. This nexus of innovation is very broad.

As someone who sees the challenge of AHSCs through both the institutional as well as policy lens, some key areas of priority are implicated and which are presented as conclusions:

  • Funding of AHSCs is not quite the same as funding the constituent parts, so national policies need to be harmonised if AHSCs are to become effective accelerators of innovation and enablers of entrepreneurs. This will raise coordination challenges for governments as the incentives they deploy may come from different pots of money with differing purposes.

  • Institutional design is important and only suitably high performing institutions should comprise an AHSC; this has implications for whether a national accreditation system should be used (England), or policies and initiatives to advance the role of AHSCs (Canada).

  • Commercialisation design is important and plays to national policies on public ownership of publicly funded research, whether state-owned research infrastructure should be disposed off to non-state ownership, with corresponding implications for the employment status of entrepreneurs. National taxation and entrepreneurial policies can be remarkably short-sighted and counter-productive; we really need to understand how bad some national legal frameworks are, and how good others are. AHSCs will be embedded in these legal frameworks, so how productive they can be is linked.

  • We really need to understand how national policies can encourage the introduction of high performing AHSCs where none exist, or prune the numbers of AHSCs if they have proliferated without also achieving high levels of (international) recognition and performance, or enable existing AHSCs to be real drivers of innovation.

NOTE:

Presented at the 2012 Entrepreneuriship conference in Maastricht in March 2012: see here for more details.

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Where to be an entrepreneur in Europe? Not France!

Carpenter ant, Camponotus sp.

A French Entrepreneur?

A paper by academics Nadine Levratto and Evelyne Serverin, “Become Independent! The Paradoxical Constraints of France’s Autoentrepreneur Regime” (available here) shows the failure of this programme to generate entrepreneurial behaviours.

What went wrong, and why should other member states not copy France?

Since January 2009, when the autoentrepreneur category of working was first introduced, over 550,000 people have registered. They system differs from the also complex Regime Reel in France by taxing autoentrepeneurs on gross turnover (up to the allowed ceiling of €32100, at the rate of between 12 and 21.3%) rather than on revenue (turnover less expenses). People in this category discharge all their taxes by paying this amount, but do not get to claim expenses and do not need to do VAT accounting. In France, the very high national debt is driving lawmakers toward a regime that is levying the regressive social charges on everything from the first euro (!); this is evidence more of desperation than leadership — that entrepreneurs have been captured by this is not surprising.

Almost 50% of autoentrepreneurs in France had an annual turnover of zero, while 15% had a turnover of less than €1000. Only 500 autoentrepreneurs exceeded the upper threshold.

This regime fails because it is not about being entrepreneurial, but about collecting tax and creating bureaucratic barriers to success: more specifically:

  • autoentreprenurs can’t hire anyone — the authors speak of them as ‘lonesome’, working out their entrepreneurial dream on their own, forbidden to collaborate with others, even hire an assistant
  • they can’t recycle capital to build the business as it taxed away at the turnover level as there is no recognition of the extraordinary expenses of business startups
  • because of the structure of business, they are a bad risk for banks to lend to
  • two autoentpreneurs can’t collaborate as tax authorities would view them as a company
  • there is an excessive concern for employment law and insufficient understanding that entrepreneurial behaviours are not about being secure, but about risk, and therefore has little to do with employment law itself.

There should be no surprise that the system failed and people outside France can say simply on this basis, and with some justification, that the French don’t have a word for ‘entrepreneur’ as clearly they don’t seem to understand what the word means. Indeed, the authors note that the programme has been such a dismal failure, that the French government is rebranding it as better for second incomes, than entrepreneurialism.

What we need is an analysis of these failing efforts at entrepreneurialism by member states, certainly as a warning to others, but more importantly to establish a general understanding of how entrepreneurialism should be treated within member states from the perspective of taxation and law.

If I were forum-shopping for a member state to pursue my entrepreneurial dreams, I would be looking for a country with light-touch taxation, and flexible employment rules.  Start-ups have real problems with cash flow and locking them into high social charges and rigid employment laws is counterproductive.

What is worrying is that other member states, according the authors, have copied this regime: Portugal (recibos verdes) and Poland (samozatrudnierie). Others may be thinking about it. We should all be very afraid of this.

If you are entrepreneurial or have experience in specific member states, please email or comment. Which do you think is the best country in Europe to start a business or be entrepreneurial?